[Editor’s note: While written in Gill’s handwriting, his involvement in the creation of this document is unclear. A probable explanation may be that he copied it from publication elsewhere to then enclose in a letter home, and as such it has been included here with letter correspondence.]
Review of Attack on Convoy ONS 154
In the Dec issue of RCNM[R?] we gave an account of U-boat attacks on ONS 154. Rarely has an attack on a Convoy been pressed home with such fury and as further information has become available we are able to fill in some of the details.
To begin with a brief recapitulation. ONS154 consisted of 47 merchant ships and sailed from UK enroute to NA on Dec 12/42. On the seventh night out a series of attacks began and extended over the next 3 nights resulting in the loss by torpedo of 13 ships. That the Convoy was attacked by one of the largest concentrations of U boats with which an escort has had to deal in this war seems clear. And they were attacking not only in large numbers but they were well organized. HMCS Battleford reports that on one occasion she sighted 4 U boats in line on the surface ahead exchanging signals and the whole offensive operation indicates that little had been left to chance.
Against such a powerful assault the escort group faced two serious handicaps. First, it could expect little or no help in the way of air cover, for the action took place beyond the effective range of land based planes. Second the escort was under-strength. HM Destroyer “Burwell” was to have joined the escort but she broke down and then left HMCS St Laurent as the only destroyer in the group, supported by HMC Corvettes Battleford, Chilliwack, Shediac, Nepanee and Kenogami.
The incessant attacks for four nights and the Burwells failure imposed a heavy burden on the St Laurent and the supporting Corvettes. It meant added work and responsibility. If continuing protection was to be efforded the convoy, extensive risks had to be avoided and the escort kept intact. This explains, in part, the St Laurents Comm. Officers decision not to ram, in the circumstance he described in these words.
“It was the night of Dec 28 and coming in from astern a U boat was sighted dead ahead at 600 yds, making dense smoke. They could not possibly have seen me, and ramming was an almost irresistible delight with my officers clamoring for it, but it is submitted that my decision, not to ram, was correct, taking into account the concentration of U boats”.
Forsaking the opportunity to ram, the St Laurent attacked with Oerlikon and 4.7 and one H.E. registered a hit. Kenogami also picked up the target and opened fire with Oerlikons but most of the shells ricocheted of the steel hull. The U-boat dived and a pattern of depth charges was laid upon her.
But there was no relief. U-boats seemed to be everywhere. While this was going on three ships went up on the Starboard side and it appeared “said the Senior Officer in the St Laurent that I should make over there and pick off any U boats escaping astern. I eased down when I reached the rear ships and steamed astern disregarding survivors. An echo was picked up and attack carried out. Then, I passed up the starboard side and observed some firing at a dim object and I joined it. The convoy was full of U boats firing white tracer and merchant ship replying with pink tracer. Several more ships went up, including the Commodore. Suddenly all was quiet.”
The U-boats were given a severe mauling and attacks virtually ceased on Dec 28. A few torpedoes were fired the next night but they were not effective. HM Fleet Destroyers Milne and Meteor joined the escort on the 29th but they were short of fuel and as the refueling ship had been torpedoed they were detached along with HMCS Battleford and Shediac. “With their departure I thought,” said the Escort Commander “that we were done for, and that the coming night would see our final [carving?] with only four escorts with the convoy, and two of these with A/S out of action. But no attacks were made. U-boats kept us in contact and the departure of the escorts had undoubtedly been observed. They did not attack. They had had enough.”
Three escorts barely escaped the date that struck down the 13 merchant ships. One of them was the Milne. As if to enroll her without loss of time as a respected member of the community, 4 torpedoes were fired at her 45 minutes after she joined the convoy. Fortunately all of them missed. Torpedoes were also fired at HMCS St Laurent and Napanee, but they were observed in time and successful avoiding action was taken.
M 13, Jan/43
Directorate of Intelligence, Naval Staff, Naval Services HQ
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